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JOHN COONEY
FREEING MYSTICISM:
EPISTEMIC STANDARDS IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE
ABSTRACT
With the growth of epistemology, an important debate in philosophy of 
religion has arisen: can mystical encounters—purported feelings of intense 
unity with the divine—serve as epistemic warrants?  In this paper, I examine 
two of the most prominent and promising standards by which to determine 
the veridicality of such encounters—those of William Alston and Richard 
Swinburne—and demonstrate their respective strengths and shortcomings.  
Considering these shortcomings, I compose and defend my own set of criteria 
to use in evaluating the veridicality of putative mystical experiences which 
draws upon the subject’s religious tradition, rationality, and affectivity.
INTRODUCTION
Ever since William James published his seminal book The 
Varieties of Religious Experience in 1902, mysticism has taken hold 
of the discussions of theologians and philosophers alike, mainly in 
the debate over its status as an epistemic warrant.1 This debate asks 
whether a subject is justified in forming beliefs about God based 
on a mystical experience. In this paper, I seek to contribute to this 
epistemological discussion by determining the grounds on which we 
can deem a putative mystical encounter veridical.2 Amongst scholars 
who have argued for mysticism as a source of epistemic justification, 
many possible solutions have been posited. Unfortunately, not one has 
contained a truly compelling standard for determining the authenticity 
of mystical experiences. I thus attempt to remedy the shortcomings 
of the standards proposed by William Alston and Richard Swinburne 
by offering a standard which draws on the subject’s religious tradition, 
rationality, and affectivity in considering the veridicality of a purported 
mystical experience.3
I. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF 
CURRENT THEORIES  
Those who argue that mystical practices can serve as epistemic 
warrants fall on a spectrum concerning standards of veridicality. On 
one end are theories that seek a vantage point external to mystical 
practices themselves from which to judge the veridicality of mystical 
1 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Penguin 
Group, 1982).
2 Several of the scholars referenced below use “authentic” and “genuine” 
synonymously with “veridical.”  While recognizing their nuances, I will keep 
with this pattern and use all three words interchangeably.  
3 Unless otherwise stated, I will operate within the Christian mystical 
tradition throughout this paper. I do this both because it is the context in 
which the above authors write and because it is the tradition with which I 
am most familiar. 
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experiences. On the other end, there are the less popular self-
authentication theories.4 These theories allege that mystical experiences 
are, by their very nature, veridical. In this section, I will expose the 
shortcomings of the two most promising approaches—William 
Alston’s and Richard Swinburne’s—before showing how my suggested 
epistemic standard can avoid them.  
In Perceiving God, William Alston defends the ability of mystical 
practices to serve as epistemic warrants by demonstrating them to be 
socially established doxastic practices. Any doxastic practice is “the 
exercise of a family of belief-forming mechanisms” and requires what 
Alston terms an “overrider system,” i.e. a system—to determine 
whether an experience is genuine by comparing it to background 
beliefs and other doxastic practices.5 “Attached to each practice,” he 
writes, “is an ‘overrider system’ of beliefs and procedures that the 
subject can use in subjecting prima facie justified beliefs to further 
tests when that is called for.”6 To take an everyday example, consider 
the overriders we place on sense perception; whenever we perceive 
something through the senses, we scrutinize it through the lens of 
reason, memory, the testimonies of others, etc., to determine the 
likelihood that our perception is accurate. Such consultation with 
overriders can either be subconscious (e.g. when something seen 
is typical) or conscious (e.g. when something seen is atypical). In 
instances where a perception is not countered by the overrider system, 
we are justified in taking it to be veridical. Regarding Christian 
mystical practices (CMP) specifically, Alston lists “the Bible, the 
ecumenical councils of the undivided church, Christian experience 
through the ages, Christian thought, and more generally the Christian 
tradition as normative sources of its overrider system.”7 In other words, 
Christian mysticism cross-references the content and phenomenological 
characteristics of an experience with the Bible, ecclesial authority, and 
Christian tradition to determine whether it is veridical.  
Alston exhibits sound philosophical work in his book, and his 
overrider system has several benefits. Its concrete standard operates as 
a rigorous vetting system, preventing the undesirable and untenable 
conclusion that any putative mystical experience is veridical.8 
Additionally, the fact that it has a corollary in other doxastic practices 
4 Robert A. Oakes, “Mysticism, Veridicality, and Modality,” Faith and 
Philosophy 2, no. 3 (1985): 217-24. To my knowledge, Robert Oakes—
with whom I will not here contend—is the only serious proponent of self-
authentication.
5 William Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 165.
6 Alston, Perceiving God, 159.
7 Alston, Perceiving God, 193.
8 This is to say that he disallows self-authentication theories.
serves to increase its credibility. Yet, despite these valuable elements, 
Alston’s system suffers from several difficulties.
Jerome Gellman notes the first shortcoming in his article, “A 
Problem for the Christian Mystical Doxastic Practice.” Gellman 
argues that Alston’s proposed overrider system for Christian mystical 
practices has been compromised by mistaken physiological theories, the 
historical marginalization of women, and “the Church’s need to impose 
ecclesiastical order on uncontrolled spirituality.”9 If the standard being 
used in determining an experience’s genuineness is compromised—in 
this case, through ignorance and historical struggles for power—then 
it cannot be counted on to produce accurate evaluations. Notice that 
Gellman’s critique does not attack the idea of an overrider system itself 
but rather what Alston chooses to include in CMP’s specific overrider 
system. The problem lies in the fact that the content of CMP’s 
overrider is rooted in history and doctrine, both of which are, at least in 
part, products of chance and not divine revelation.  
The second difficulty with Alston’s overrider system also stems 
from his emphasis on doctrine.10 In The Theology of the Spiritual Life, 
Father Joseph de Guibert discusses the discernment of spirits in 
mysticism. He composes a long list—quoted partially by Alston—
of the respective effects of godly and satanic spirit-fueled mystical 
experiences. He then issues the following note of caution: “because a 
thought contains nothing contrary to Church doctrine or because an 
impulse has nothing incompatible with the law of God in it, it does 
not thereby follow that either should be immediately regarded as an 
inspiration of a good spirit.”11 Assuming that a demonic force could 
create a pseudo-mystical experience without contradicting Church 
doctrine, de Guibert concludes that the standard of veridicality must 
not rely solely on the intellectual content of an experience but take into 
account the affective content as well, for an evil spirit cannot replicate 
both the intellectual and emotive dimensions of a mystical experience. 
It is the evil spirit’s inability to bring about peace which prevents a fall 
into a Cartesian universal skepticism regarding mystical experiences. 
In light of de Guibert’s concerns, clearly, Alston fails to consider the 
affective component of mysticism seriously enough.  
 The third problem plaguing Alston is one that he himself points 
out—the question of religious pluralism. Terrence Tilley formulates the 
9 Jerome Gellman, “A Problem for the Christian Mystical Doxastic Practice,” 
Philo: The Journal of the Society of Humanist Philosophers 13, no. 1 
(2010): 26.
10 I use the word “emphasis” because, while Alston does include other 
elements in the content of his overrider system for CMP, the focus is 
heavily doctrinal and ecclesial.  
11 Joseph de Guibert, The Theology of the Spiritual Life, trans. Paul Barrett 
(London: Sheed and Ward, 1954), 139.
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problem in this way: “Because mystical practices in different religious 
traditions have different background beliefs and overrider systems, 
they are irreducibly different, not a single practice with multiple 
variations.”12 Under Alston’s framework, no unified mystical doxastic 
practice can exist but rather only a multiplicity of practices equal to the 
number of diverse religious beliefs. Even within one religious tradition 
there can exist hundreds of different practices. Alston’s response to 
religious diversity is less than satisfying: “In the absence of any external 
support for supposing that one of the competing practices is more 
accurate than my own, the only rational course for me is to sit tight.”13 
Indeed, he even concedes later that “diversity reduces somewhat 
the maximal degree of epistemic justification derivable from CMP” 
and “reduces the rationality of engaging in CMP.”14 Any standard 
of veridicality tethered to specific religious traditions and beliefs will 
inevitably run into this problem of religious pluralism, but it is worth 
asking whether a more persuasive response than “sit tight” can be had.
The final critique of Alston’s overrider system is one that no other 
author has, to my knowledge, noted. Alston’s system includes a qualifier: 
mysticism seldom yields new beliefs. This restriction is the natural 
consequence of his judging veridicality by doctrine and previously held 
beliefs, for a person’s mystical experience must necessarily conform to 
the belief system they held prior to the experience, or else it cannot be 
considered veridical. I quote Alston at length:
In MP [mystical practices] God may appear to me in an experience as 
supremely loving, but I already firmly believed that. There isn’t even any 
significant updating to be derived here…. The experience can add to my 
total sum of justification for believing that God is loving, even if it doesn’t 
add to the firmness of the belief…it must be acknowledged that CMP 
does not typically alter the major outlines of a person’s faith. Ordinarily 
the subject already has a more or less firm Christian faith, which is left 
largely unchanged by mystical experience. What the experience does 
yield, cognitively, is: (a) information about God’s particular relations to the 
subject; (b) additional grounds for beliefs already held, particularly the 
belief that God does exist; (c) additional “insights” into facets of  
the scheme.15
Alston’s view is internally consistent but problematic. A true mystical 
experience ought to be the pinnacle of spirituality and epistemology, 
yet under Alston’s model, belief-altering mystical experiences are likely 
to jeopardize the experience’s veridical status.16 Consider that many 
12 Terrence Tilley, “Religious Pluralism as a Problem for ‘Practical’ Religious 
Epistemology,” Religious Studies 30, no. 2 (1994): 162.
13 Alston, Perceiving God, 274.
14 Alston, Perceiving God, 275; 279.
15 Alston, Perceiving God, 207.
16 Perhaps the best example of this is Paul’s conversion on the road to 
mystical experiences catalyze religious conversion. Insofar as conversion 
involves not “insights” into a doxastic practice but rather challenges to 
it, Alston’s overrider system may skew too conservative in ruling such 
experiences unveridical. It is at least worth seeing whether we can come 
to an improved standard, since Alston’s approach sits uneasily with the 
oft-accepted notion that mysticism is authoritative for the individual. 
As James writes, “the existence of mystical states absolutely overthrows 
the pretension of non-mystical states to be the sole and ultimate 
dictators of what we may believe.”17 Alston, it would seem, attempts to 
win mysticism’s veridicality by sacrificing its potency.  
Richard Swinburne posits a more promising view than Alston’s. 
Swinburne’s “Principle of Credulity” (POC) states that granted the 
absence of particular counter-considerations, a subject (S) is justified 
in taking their perception to be genuine. Swinburne enumerates four 
such “special considerations”: (1) the conditions of the perception or 
the subject are unreliable, (2) claims made under similar circumstances 
have proved false, (3) it is very improbable on background evidence that 
X was present, and (4) X was probably not the cause of the perception.18 
Presuming the absence of these considerations, Swinburne argues that 
S is justified in taking their perception of X to be veridical.19  
Swinburne’s standard for veridicality has its benefits. Most 
prominently, it maximizes the number of mystical experiences 
considered veridical without doing so indiscriminately, which is an 
improvement on Alston’s more circumscribed view. The POC also 
has the benefit of being independent of doctrinally and historically 
based criteria. Finally, Swinburne outmaneuvers the issue of religious 
pluralism by not basing his criteria in the specific content of the 
experience but rather the circumstances surrounding it.
The POC faces two major challenges, though. The first is causal 
convolution. On account of Swinburne’s first counter-consideration, 
all causally overdetermined mystical experiences—such as those 
which occur under the influence of psychotropic drugs—are ruled 
unveridical. The converse side of this issue is the impossibility of 
verifying the ultimate cause of an experience. Without including an 
additional criterion, Swinburne cannot escape the evil-spirit dilemma, 
for it is possible for an evil spirit to contrive a pseudo-mystical 
experience that does not violate any of the above considerations. In 
other words, his standard does not allow for the subject to accurately 
Damascus. We should be wary of excluding one of the most quintessential 
mystical experiences from our veridical canon. 
17 James, Varieties of Religious Experience, 427.
18 Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 311-14.
19 This does not mean that the experience is necessarily veridical, only that S 
is justified in believing it to be so.
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determine the principal source of a mystical experience, whether it be 
God or something more nefarious.  
The second challenge of the POC is that it does not hold 
mysticism to an appropriately high standard. Swinburne certainly 
raises the bar for mystical experience candidates, yet, as the evil-
spirit dilemma shows, the POC cannot weed out all counterfeit 
experiences—say nothing about natural experiences mistaken as 
mystical. These problems demonstrate that the POC is incomplete (as 
opposed to inherently misguided), making it no more ideal a standard 
for veridicality than Alston’s.  
II. RECONSTRUCTING A STANDARD  
OF VERIDICALITY
Following the analysis of Alston and Swinburne, we can articulate 
demands of an improved standard of veridicality. First, our standard 
needs to allow for new beliefs. The subject must be justified in 
accepting beliefs that are both consistent with their religious tradition 
and those which potentially expand or overturn it. Second, it must 
have the ability to weed out false and counterfeit mystical experiences 
or, at the very least, be able to make distinctions between experiences 
that have a higher probability of being veridical and those with a 
lower probability. Third, without disregarding them, it cannot be 
too dependent on doctrine and precedent. While these are the three 
essential requirements, an ideal standard should also allow for causally 
overdetermined experiences, avoid the problem of religious pluralism, 
and demonstrate a basic consistency with historically accepted accounts 
of mystical experiences.  
To meet these demands, I propose the following criteria. They 
are divided into two categories: nonnegotiable and ancillary. The 
former must be met in order for an experience to be deemed veridical; 
concurrently, there is nothing conclusively (non)confirmative about the 
latter criteria, but they can serve to reinforce the confidence of  
the subject.  
A. NONNEGOTIABLE:
1) The doctrinal/intellectual element of the experience must conform to 
previously held beliefs or those of an established religious tradition to the degree that 
a subject can rationally accept its content. If mysticism is to be considered 
seriously as an epistemic warrant, we must be able to evaluate instances 
of it on rational grounds, not just moral and affective ones. Some critics 
may be dissatisfied with the lack of a strict rule by which to judge 
the issue of doctrine, but having an indefinite threshold is useful for 
several reasons. It first allows for the openness to newness that is present 
but limited in Alston’s framework. Where Alston limits verification 
to the subject’s religious tradition, this criterion allows him to seek 
verification through other established traditions. For instance, we 
can now allow Paul’s mystical experience to remain veridical without 
tripping over his transition from Judaism to Christianity. Second, it 
comes closer to solving the problem of religious diversity and solves 
it on the intra-denominational level. By using the subject’s rational 
purview as the measure of an experience’s intellectual content, the 
standard avoids being constrained to a single tradition. Religious 
lines become malleable, and intra-denominational division becomes 
virtually irrelevant. By way of illustration, a Muslim can perceive 
God as Trinitarian and need not dismiss his encounter as unveridical 
(although he also need not accept it). That is to say, if he can reasonably 
assent to the idea of a triune God, he is not required to consider the 
experience unveridical simply because it is incompatible with Islamic 
belief. Finally, this criterion circumvents Gellman’s objection that 
the Christian mystical tradition has been compromised by historically 
contingent sources but still functions as a restraint on putative mystical 
experiences, since the measure is not a specific tradition but the limits 
of the subject’s own rationality.  
2) The experience must be free from Swinburne’s four special considerations, 
with minor alteration. Swinburne’s considerations do well in setting 
a minimum bar for vetting mystical experiences. The one caveat 
regarding this criterion is that if an experience meets the other criteria 
in my proposed standard to an extraordinary degree but does not pass 
all of the considerations, then the subject may be justified in taking the 
experience to be overdetermined. For instance, if a subject had taken 
a psychotropic drug prior to a mystical experience, but the experience 
met all of the remaining requirements of the standard—including 
the ancillary criteria—then he could reasonably take the drug to be 
the proximate cause of a genuine mystical experience. This qualifier 
is an improvement in that it permits overdetermination while still 
rejecting experiences that fail to pass the fundamental conditions of any 
doxastic practice. Ultimately, this criterion serves a twofold purpose: it 
functions as a preliminary vetting mechanism and also helps diagnose 
overdetermination. In the latter case, if overdetermination is proven, 
this criterion is not overridden, for it is a nonnegotiable, but takes on its 
secondary function.
3) There ought to be an engaging or arresting of all of the subject’s faculties. 
This criterion differentiates between true and false experiences. 
During a true experience, discursive reasoning is suspended—although 
situational-awareness will still occur—the will is concordant with 
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God’s, bodily needs and desires are mitigated, and various physical 
reactions sometimes take place (among these accessory phenomena, 
Albert Farges lists stigmatization, levitation, luminous effluvia, 
odoriferous effluvia, mystical abstinence, inedia, and power over 
nature).20 A false experience—one caused by psychotropic drugs, 
for instance—will likely only employ one or two faculties. This 
criterion also differentiates between mystical and other forms of 
religious experience. For example, a Marian apparition would not be 
considered a mystical experience in the truest sense of the word, for 
God is not the direct object of the experience, even if it is religious in 
nature. There are two lines of justification for this criterion. First, it 
tracks the experiences of many mystics who describe their encounters 
with the divine as including the entire person.21 Second, it respects a 
mystical experience as a unitive event. Mystics in most of the world’s 
main religious traditions are careful to use non-dualistic language. If 
a mystical experience brings a person into (comm)union with God—
and perhaps the rest of the natural world—then it follows that the 
subject should be personally unified as well. Hence, this criterion is an 
important factor in the discernment of varieties of religious experiences 
and of veridical mystical experiences. This criterion sharply departs 
from both Alston and Swinburne’s systems. Each author heavily 
emphasizes the state of the subject prior to a mystical experience (e.g., 
background beliefs or levels of intoxication), but this criterion focuses 
primarily on the actual experience rather than its external context.
4) The experience ought to be transformative, catalyzing effects in the 
subject that last beyond the experience itself. We should expect a direct 
encounter with God to be a life-changing event. In the ordinary course 
of life, far less spectacular occurrences spark such about-faces: near 
death experiences, stints in prison, a cannonball to the leg, happening 
upon scripture, etc. If these events—which are hardly pedestrian but 
still less marvelous than an instance of mysticism—are sources of 
transformation, then mysticism most surely would be as well. Consider 
for instance, the change of trajectory in Gautama Buddha’s life 
following his mystical enlightenment under the Bodhi tree, or Henry 
David Thoreau’s mystical union in the woods. Mystical experiences of 
all varieties are transformative for the subject whether in the formation 
of new beliefs, the reassurance of previous beliefs, the persistence of the 
20 Albert Farges, Mystical Phenomena Compared with Their Human and 
Diabolical Counterfeits, 2nd ed., trans. S.P. Jacques (New York: Benziger 
Brothers, 1926), 514.
21 Teresa of Ávila, The Life of Saint Teresa of Ávila by Herself, trans. J.M. 
Cohen (New York: Penguin Group, 1957), 107-44. Saint Teresa, for 
instance, describes how during her mystical experiences she was able to 
read Latin and understand divine mysteries (intellect), levitate (body), and 
set aside all earthly desires (will). 
affective dimension present during the experience itself, a permanent 
physical brand (e.g., stigmatization), or a will that is more closely 
aligned with God’s. Unlike Alston’s overrider system, this criterion 
prevents the standard from being too dependent on the doctrinally 
based criteria, which are not reliable.
B. ANCILLARY:
Before exploring the ancillary criteria, a few notes about their use. 
While an experience can be deemed nonveridical, not all experiences 
that we can justifiably call veridical are necessarily so, meaning 
that a spectrum of certainty accompanies each “veridical” mystical 
experience. If a subject meets all nonnegotiable criteria, they have 
sufficient epistemic warrant (just as sense perception may be relied 
on as accurate even if it is not infallible). Hence, the role of ancillary 
criteria. They do not determine whether an experience has warrant, 
but they serve to increase the subject’s certainty in the experience’s 
veracity. Ancillary criteria, then, are dissimilar from the overriders and 
counter-considerations in that they are unable to render an experience 
unveridical but only add to a subject’s confidence.  
1) The subject is reasonably predisposed to a mystical experience. By 
“reasonably predisposed,” I simply mean practiced in introspective 
awareness and the discernment of emotional and spiritual states—
especially through prayer, mediation, self-examination, etc. While 
mystical encounters require no preparation on the part of the subject, 
a contemplative or other individual so practiced will be able to judge 
the experience’s veridicality with greater accuracy. In some ways, this 
is an extrapolation of Swinburne’s first consideration: veridicality is, 
in part, proportionately correlated with the reliability of the subject. 
However, this criterion is more nuanced in that it also judges the degree 
of veridicality.  
2) The experience is accompanied by a sense of indubitability concerning 
the veridicality of the experience and the accuracy of its content. A person 
who doubts their experience little-to-none can enjoy a higher degree 
of confidence in its veridicality than a person plagued by intense 
doubt. This is a thin criterion, but it can be useful to the subject all 
the same—particularly if mystical experiences bear any internal mark 
of veridicality. Again, the subject’s certainty has no role in Alston or 
Swinburne’s standards.
3) The experience is consistent with those of others. No plausible reason 
exists to believe that God appears to every person in the same manner 
or discloses the same content. If, however, a subject can cross-check 
their experience with the experience of another, then they naturally 
stand on firmer epistemic grounds, in just the same way we trust 
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scientific trials that are replicable. Simply, if two experiences are 
phenomenologically similar but dissimilar in content and cause, we 
cannot issue differing verdicts on the question of veridicality. The 
implication of this principle—sometimes referred to as the principle 
of causal indifference—is that if an experience coincides with other 
accounts, then the subject can demonstrate more confidence in the 
genuineness of their experience. Of course, a mystical encounter unlike 
any before it may be veridical nonetheless.22 
CONCLUSION
If we make the assertion that mystical experiences possess epistemic 
warrant, we must also admit that the beliefs derived from these 
experiences are of the highest kind. How could knowledge acquired via 
a direct encounter with the transcendent God be otherwise? This being 
said, they are also the most dangerous, especially if wholly authoritative 
for the subject. Accordingly, we must find a way to preserve the power 
and authority of mystical practices while simultaneously ensuring  
their authenticity.  
In attempting to meet this challenge, I believe I have moved the 
present conversation forward by determining the qualities that ought 
to be incorporated into an effective veridicality standard. Nevertheless, 
many questions are left to be answered. Even if proved veridical, is 
mysticism authoritative for others or only the subject? Wholly or 
partially? Can better knowledge of mysticism as a doxastic practice 
make it as useful as sense perception? To conclude with the famous 
words of the Catholic theologian Karl Rahner, “In the days ahead, 
you will either be a mystic (one who has experienced God for real) or 
nothing at all.”23  
22 To further distinguish this criterion from the second nonnegotiable, consider 
them in terms of form versus content. A Christian can have a mystical 
experience that is doctrinally sound yet be wholly unprecedented in the 
way it is perceived (i.e. similar in content but not form). This does nothing 
to decrease the veridicality of the experience. Nonetheless, a person who 
has an experience that is doctrinally sound and parallels the perceptive 
characteristics of another’s experience (i.e. similar in content and form) can 
exhibit greater confidence in the veridicality of their experience.
23 Many thanks to Dr. Edward Glowienka, whose insights greatly informed 
this paper.
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